DigitalCommons@NYLS
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-2022

Anchorage Homeless Shelter Denied Injunction in Challenge to
Revised Anti-Discrimination Ordinance
Arthur S. Leonard

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
Part of the Law and Gender Commons

Anchorage Homeless Shelter Denied Injunction in
Challenge to Revised Anti-Discrimination Ordinance
By Arthur S, Leonard
When a transgender homeless
woman seeking shelter in Anchorage,
Alaska, in 2018 was dropped off by
police at Hope Center, a non-profit
religious organization that operates a
shelter for women called the Downtown
Soup Kitchen, she was turned away
for a variety of reasons, including the
shelter’s rules against providing housing
for individuals who did not meet its
definition of “biological woman’ –
that is, a person identified at birth as
female. The Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission received a complaint
and initiated action against Hope
Center, which then sued for injunctive
relief in federal court, successfully
arguing that it was not covered by
the non-discrimination provisions
of Anchorage’s anti-discrimination
ordinance. See Downtown Soup Kitchen
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 406 F.
Supp. 3d 776 (D. Alaska 2019).
In response to this litigation, the
Anchorage Assembly undertook a
revision of relevant provisions, repealing
some, and enacting new sections. In
response, Hope Center filed a new
lawsuit, seeking injunctive relief again,
arguing that it was in danger of being
prosecuted under the revised ordinance.
The city moved to dismiss for lack
of standing, claiming that the revised
ordinance would not subject Hope
Center to prosecution for excluding
transgender women from Downtown
Soup Kitchen. On December 20, U.S.
District Judge Sharon L. Gleason granted
the motion with respect to the public
accommodation provision, but denied
the motion in part with respect to the
real estate provision, finding ambiguity
about whether an exemption for “places
which are institutional in nature” would
apply to shield Hope Center from
enforcement, but that the municipality’s
representation, in an affidavit by the
executive director of the Commission
disavowing to seek enforcement against
Hope Center, deprived it of standing for
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injunctive relief, but not for damages
for the chilling of its First Amendment
rights for the few months between
enactment of the revisions and the
filing of the affidavit: May 25 to August
16, 2021. Downtown Soup Kitchen v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 2021 WL
5999391 (D. Alaska).
The statutory interpretation task
taken up by Judge Gleason was
complicated, not least because the
legislative history showed that members
of the Assembly had differing views
about whether the revised statute’s real
estate provisions would apply to the
operation of a facility such as Downtown
Soup Kitchen. Hope Center argues that
the provision applies, and it still needs
injunctive relief to protect its free
exercise and free speech rights against
potential enforcement actions. The
executive director of the Commission
contends that the exemption protects
Hope Center.
What was not ambiguous was the
Assembly’s decision, in line with the
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling
in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141
S. Ct. 168 (June 17, 2021), not to treat
Hope Center’s shelter operation as
a public accommodation. In Fulton,
the Supreme Court held, among other
things, that a Catholic foster care agency
was not a public accommodation within
the meaning of Philadelphia’s Human
Rights Ordinance, because its services
were not available to the general public,
but only to those who met specific
criteria as a result of a screening process.
Similarly, Hope Center established that
admission to its homeless shelter was
not open to the general public, but only
to cisgender women who met a detailed
list of criteria.
On the other hand, the Assembly’s
attempt to clarify the operation of
its ordinance with respect to housing
facilities served only to muddy the
waters. It repealed a provision that
specifically exempted homeless shelters

from the real estate provisions, and
instead adopted the following language:
“It is unlawful for the owner, lessor,
manager, agent, brokerage service,
or other person having the right to
sell, lease, rent [or] advertise . . . real
property to . . . [r]efuse to sell, lease or
rent, or to otherwise make unavailable,
the real property to a person because
of race, color, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, religion, national origin,
marital status, age, familial status, or
physical or mental disability . . . [or] [d]
iscriminate against a person because
of race, color, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, religion, national origin,
marital status, age, familial status, or
physical or mental disability.” Another
provision forbids communications “that
indicate any preference, limitation,
specification or discrimination” based
on the same list of characteristics.
However, the revision includes as a
separate subsection a new “institutionalplaces” exemption, which states that the
prohibition of discrimination “does not
apply to places which are institutional in
nature and for which housing is merely
incidental to a broader purpose, such as
rehabilitation or medical care.”
Judge Gleason found that the possible
application of this exemption to Hope
Center’s homeless shelter for women was
ambiguous or unclear. “The meaning
of ‘institutional in nature’ is not clear,”
she wrote, “and it is ambiguous whether
Hope Center is a ‘place . . . for which
housing is merely incidental to a broader
purpose.’ This question may depend,”
she continued, “on the unit of analysis;
housing is not ‘merely incidental to a
broader purpose’ if the women’s shelter
is the ‘place’ in question, but might be
‘merely incidental’ if the ‘place’ is Hope
Center as a whole – an organization
that offers many services in addition
to its shelter operations. Thus, the plain
text of section 5.20.020, including the
institutional-places exemption, does
not clearly indicate whether Hope

Center’s shelter operations would be
covered under the provision” and thus
exempt from complying with the nondiscrimination requirements.
The court also found the legislative
history ambiguous on this point,
noting comments from members of
the Assembly indicating differing
views about whether the institutionalplaces exemption applies to Downtown
Soup Kitchen. The judge notes that in
this litigation, the Municipality “only
asserts that the institutional-places
exemption ‘may well apply’ to Hope
Center depending on ‘facts regarding
to what extend Hope Center’s homeless
sheltering is “incidental” to the other
aspects of its religious ministry.” Thus,
she found, Hope Center “has offered
a colorable argument” that the nondiscrimination obligation under the real
estate provisions applies to it, interfering
with its ability to operate the shelter
consistent with its religious precepts and
to communicate its access policy to the
public.
In terms of Hope Center’s application
for injunctive relief, the court
determined that Hope Center’s intention
to operate in violation of the statute
seems clear, but that the likelihood
that the challenged provisions will be
enforced against it are slim. Certainly,
the affidavit filed by the executive
director of the Commission suggests
that the Commission will not initiate
any action, based on its present view of
the exemption, and that if any individual
files a charge with the Commission,
it is likely to be dismissed. On the
other hand, the Center argued that the
Commission’s disavowal is “not legally
binding” and that “nothing prevents this
Director, or the next, from changing
his or her mind about enforcement
and again turning on Hope Center.”
However, the court found that the
disavowal “indicates a low likelihood of
enforcement.” Hope Center replied that
it was just the executive director, not the
full Commission, that was taking this
position, and furthermore that anybody
who claimed discrimination could file a
complaint with the Commission, setting
in train a mandatory investigative
process and potential civil and criminal
sanctions, but defendants responded

that under the ordinance the power
to dismiss complaints lies with the
executive director, who could forestall
these activities by simply dismissing
a complaint as falling within the
exemption.
On this point, Judge Gleason
concluded, “Given that the Executive
Director
exercises
primary
responsibility for screening out noncognizable complaints, the Bolanos
Anderson affidavit is sufficient to
establish that enforcement against Hope
Center is unlikely.”
On that basis, she concluded, Hope
Center lacked standing for prospective
injunctive relief, but could seek
compensation for the chilling of its
First Amendment rights during the
short period between enactment of the
ordinance and the filing of the affidavit
in response to this lawsuit. Hope Center
lacked standing to seek injunctive
relief against enforcement of the public
accommodation provision, in light of
the court’s conclusion, consistent with
the earlier litigation and the Fulton
decision, that Hope Center and its
shelter are not public accommodations
under the ordinance.
Alliance Defending Freedom is
litigating on behalf of Hope Center, so
one must anticipate the likelihood of an
appeal to the 9th Circuit. Judge Gleason
was appointed by President Barack
Obama. ■

U.S. District Court
Rules Against
Maryland School
Choice Program’s
Anti-Discrimination
Policy on Free
Speech Grounds
By Joseph Hayes Rochman
In Bethel Ministries, Inc. v. Salmon,
2021 WL 5882343, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 236859 (D. Md. December 10,
2021), Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher
(D. Md., Northern Div.), ruling on
a motion for summary judgment,
found that a Maryland school-choice
program, Broadening Options and
Opportunities for Students Today
(“BOOST”), violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment by
revoking Bethel Christian Academy’s
(“Bethel Christian”) eligibility because
its admissions policy was inconsistent
with the program’s policy prohibiting
discrimination in admissions on the basis
of sexual orientation. Judge Gallagher
concluded that requiring Bethel
Christian to remove the discriminatory
section of its admissions policy
regulated Bethel Christian’s speech,
not its conduct. Revoking eligibility
based on the admissions policy was
viewpoint-based discrimination which
imposed an unconstitutional condition
on the taxpayer-funded public benefit
program, in the court’s opinion.
Bethel Ministries is a Pentecostal
Christian Church in Savage, Maryland.
The church operates Bethel Christian
which serves Kindergarten through 8th
grade. BOOST is a scholarship-based
school-choice program enacted by
the Maryland legislature in 2016. The
program provides scholarships directly
to students eligible for the reducedprice lunch program to attend eligible
private schools of their choice. The
BOOST Advisory Board reviews and
certifies applicants and sets scholarship
amounts. The program’s 2017 budget
was $5.5 million, and it has increased
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